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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA-1983 JOINT VENTURE
IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS-THE SUPPLEMENT OF DETAIL,
IN AN ATTEMPT To ATTRACT FOREIGN INVESTMENT*
The People's Republic of China's (PRC) revitalization of inter-
national relations in 1976 led to many changes in Chinese law, in-
cluding the issuance of the 1979 Joint Venture Law.' The purpose
of the 1979 Joint Venture Law was first to facilitate a level of in-
dustrial development in China on par with the industrial world,2
*Although the 1983 Joint Venture Implementing Regulations are not that recent of a de-
velopment, the Journal recognizes the value of publishing substantial portions the tele-
grams quoted and cited throughout the piece.
Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investment, July 8, 1979, unofficial translation printed in 125 CONG. REc. 7793 (1979), re-
printed in 18 I.L.M. 1041 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Joint Venture Law]. Interaction be-
tween East and West through this 1979 law is especially important because joint ventures
are one of the most integrated forms of international cooperation. "The joint venture not
only places responsibility upon each of the investing parties but also provides the means to
bridge a vast cultural and economic gulf between societies." Klingenberg & Pattison, Joint
Ventures in the People's Republic of China: The New Legal Environment, 19 VA. J. INT'L
L. 807, 814 (1979). Certain features are common to all joint ventures: pooled assets, shared
profits, shared losses, and joint management. Id. In a Chinese joint venture the foreign in-
vestor must invest at least 25% of the original joint venture investment and afford limited
liability to investors. Ultimate control of the joint venture will apparently rest in the hands
of the Chinese government, an arrangement that is not the standard international practice
but is common in China. Finally, a transfer of interest in the enterprise requires unanimous
consent by the parties. Bosco, The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ven-
tures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 217, 223 (1980). The
1979 Joint Venture Law provided a broad framework, but since its enactment both Chinese
and foreign investors have sought a more formal system for negotiating and enforcing joint
venture contracts. Note, Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China, 14 J. INT'L L. &
EcON. 133, 144-45 (1979). This desire for more formalities in negotiations stems from the
lack of detail in the 1979 Joint Venture Law, a flaw that caused delays in assessing and
processing foreign investment. The 1983 Implementing Regulations should remedy that de-
fect. See INT'L. TRADE AD., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, Joint Venture Agreement in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, app. A, art. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Trade Report].
Since the "Four Modernizations Movement" in 1980, the PRC has emphasized reform,
coordination, and promotion of new technology to achieve balanced economic growth. A. Ho,
DEVELOPING THE ECONOMY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 63-65 (1982). Ideally, joint
venture participants will primarily be in the technology field. Trade Report, supra at app.
A.
, For a general review of Chinese law and business, see Note, An Analysis of Chinese
Contractual Policy and Practice, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 1229 (1981). The People's Republic of
China (PRC) believes that the most practical approach to modernization is by acquiring
technology directly from the western industrial states. Id. at 1229-30.
The terms "industrial world," "industrial nation," and "Western" refer to ideological ten-
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and second, to remedy China's foreign currency imbalance.3 For-
eign investors received the 1979 Joint Venture Law with great ex-
pectations, but because of significant ambiguities and restraints on
foreign investment, enthusiasm waned and the expected invest-
ment failed to materialize.4 The Chinese response to this lack of
investment came on September 26, 1983, when the Chinese Minis-
try of Foreign Economic Relations on Trade (MOFERT) released
Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Re-
dencies rather than strict geographical location. Generally, they are used in reference to
"capitalist" economies such as those in Japan, the European Economic Community, and the
United States.
The movement toward greater industrial development was a portion of the "Four Mod-
ernizations" campaign, in which the PRC emphasized economic modernization of industry,
agriculture, defense and science and technology. See New Economic Laws and Regulations,
BEIJING REV., Nov. 23, 1981, at 6. Supra note 2, at 1229.
' China has an excellent payment record and has followed accepted international pay-
ment practices, but if its trade activity expands as it hopes, China will need increasing for-
eign currency reserves to maintain steady growth. Shaney, Selected Legal Aspects of
China's Conduct of Foreign Trade, 11 INT'L LAW. 641, 650-52 (1977).
From the perspective of the PRC, the purpose of the 1979 Joint Venture Law was four-
fold: (1) to attract advanced foreign capital and equipment needed in the PRC's moderniza-
tion plan, (2) to begin balancing imports and exports, (3) to save PRC capital for its own
investments, and (4) to provide training needed for management skills. Note, China's New
Joint Venture Law: Analysis and Economic Overview, 4 B.C. INT'L COMP. L.J. 115, 127
(1981).
' Since China relaxed its restrictions against foreign intercourse in 1976, trade has in-
creased dramatically. The past few years have witnessed substantial expansion, especially in
the area of Chinese purchases of foreign made goods. Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 1,
at 811. Due to the ambiguity that surrounds the law, however, the "utilization of joint ven-
tures in the economy has been conspicuously absent." Id. Not only has it been absent, but
also joint venture activity actually has been decreasing. For example, in 1980, 20 joint ven-
tures were approved, representing a market value of investments of $177 million. In 1981,
the total number of approved joint ventures dropped to 19, but the market value of invest-
ments plummeted to $20 million. See Trade Report, supra note 1, at 3; see also Dept. of
Commerce, Incoming Telegram 1 (Sept. 8, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Incoming Telegram/
Implementing Regulations].
Perhaps the details regarding joint ventures were omitted deliberately. The Chinese may
have intended that the detailed terms of the agreements "be spelled out by the parties in
their contract association." See Trade Report, supra note 1, at 12. The Chinese may have
assumed the eventual existence of a Chinese civil commercial code, as well as patent, bank-
ing, insurance, and other legislation, and believed it preferable to have separate detailed
laws in these areas instead of burdening the Joint Venture Law with such details. Id. One
other alternative is that the Chinese merely omitted the details of operation to maintain a
firm grip over joint venture activities. Finally, it may be that since this style of law and
business structure was so new to the Chinese drafters that they simply did not know what
details to include.
The lack of detail may also simply be due to strict central government control. If the
communist government proposes one economic state plan, alternatives in reaching it are
limited. Since there may be only one way to reach such a goal, there is no danger of depart-
ing from that one established procedure, and, therefore, there is no need for details.
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public of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign In-
vestment.5 The two objectives of the Implementing Regulations are
to clarify the nebulous characteristics of the 1979 Joint Venture
Laws and to stimulate foreign investment by providing new legal
materials.7 In light of the purposes behind these new regulations,
6 Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, Sept. 20, 1983, official translation
printed in BEIJING REV., Oct. 10, 1983, supplement [hereinafter cited as Implementing Regu-
lations]. According to Chinese figures, 188 joint ventures between foreign companies and
Chinese enterprises were operating in China at the end of 1983, attracting $348 million of
foreign investment. Dept. of Commerce, Incoming Telegram, Subject: Japanese Investment
in China 1 (Aug. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Incoming Telegram/Japan].
Generally, the Japanese and Chinese are heavy trade associates. The type of investment
in China attracting the most attention and concern in Japan is the equity joint venture. Yet
surprisingly, Japan has captured only a small part of this market by participating in only 14
of the 188 joint ventures that were operating by the end of 1983, according to Chinese
figures. (The Japanese count only nine ventures; the discrepancy arises because the Chinese
total includes Japanese companies operating through Hong Kong subsidiaries). This level of
Japanese activity lags behind both Hong Kong, which leads the field by far, and the United
States, which had 21 joint ventures by the Chinese count. The American edge is even more
significant in dollar amount since Japanese joint ventures tend to be smaller operations than
United States enterprises. Incoming Telegram/Japan at 1.
" The Implementing Regulations were designed to "flesh out" the Joint Venture Law of
1979 and to address many of the more complex problems facing joint ventures under the
1979 Joint Venture Law. Incoming Telegram/Implementing Regulations, supra note 4, at 1.
The Implementing Regulations provided needed clarity in an area where confusion had
reigned and should, therefore, represent a significant step in encouraging foreign investment
in China. Id.; BEIJING REV,, Nov. 9, 1981 at 6.
The PRC provides many measures to encourage investment. For a list of current eco-
nomic legislation dealing with promotion of investment, see Pattison, China's Developing
Legal Framework for Foreign Investment: Experience and Expectations, 13 LAW & POL'Y.
INT'L. Bus. 89, 93-95 (1981). Yet, even with new Implementing Regulations or trade laws, the
ability of the Chinese to promote investment will depend on the degree to which the govern-
ment acknowledges the law and fulfills the purpose of the joint venture. The Chinese gov-
ernment must enforce these new details of joint ventures in a manner that will truly en-
courage investment. A careful observer of China's current political sphere will notice that
even though written laws are in force, mass executions, arrests without charges, and a lack
of due process all continue to occur. From these actions, though not of a commercial nature,
one may infer that the Chinese government will ignore written laws when the laws are not in
its best interest. Address by Dr. Thomas W. Ganschow, "Introduction to the Law and the
Politics of the People's Republic of China," Meeting of the International Law Society of the
University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia (April 16, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Ganschow Ad-
dress]. Also, even if the Chinese do make a sincere attempt to adhere to and administer
their written law, they lack the skilled people to do so. With a country of over one billion
people, and only 2,000 lawyers, the vast majority of the nation will continue to practice law
as it always has, through interpersonal communication. Id. Although the Chinese are re-
searching western law, it will still be some time before the legal community, or at least the
commercial legal force, will be ready for a strong international practice. See also supra notes
2, 5 and accompanying text. In the optimism following the fall of the Gang-of-Four in 1976,
China set ambitious economic growth targets, initiated reforms to restructure the country's
economic system, and decentralized decision making. Trade Report, supra note 1, at 1. This
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this Recent Development discusses several important aspects of
the new Implementing Regulations, including the clarifying func-
tion and the Implementing Regulations' new administrative proce-
dures, tax regulations, labor relations, and access to the Chinese
home market as examples of incentive measures.
Generally, any union of business will have debatable issues. In
fact, the vagueness of the 1979 Joint Venture Law, combined with
the traditional Chinese approach to law and the Chinese lack of
experience in the international business arena, may make a joint
venture with China particularly susceptible to discord.' Histori-
cally, experience has taught the Chinese to be wary of codified
laws.9 As early as 220 B.C. China had extremist, legalistic leaders
optimism inspired an active pursuit for Chinese-Western trade relations. For a history of
the evolution from Chairman Mao policies to the 1976 optimism which culminated in 1979
with the Joint Venture Law, see Bosco, supra note 1, at 217-22; see also Pattison, supra
note 7, at 91-92.
6 See Trade Report, supra note 1, at 7-10 for a discussion of the motivating factors and
expectations of capitalist and socialist parties to a joint venture. Any potential investor in
China must recognize some of the challenges of direct investment in China, usually in the
area of capital structure, management, contributions, pricing, profit distribution, or repatri-
ation. Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 1, at 839. For a general overview of expectations
in the areas of taxation, exchange rates, dispute resolution, and copy and patent rights, see
Note, supra note 3, at 128.
In addition to business complications arising out of any capitalist/socialist business union,
China is prone to difficulties because of its expectations of non-contracted obligations, limi-
tations on government authority, lack of accountability, and the differing professional stan-
dards and social and economic values. See generally Dept. of Commerce, Incoming Tele-
gram, Subject: After the Contract is Signed: The Experience of U.S. Companies in
Shanghai, International Trade Administration: China Office (Aug. 1984) [hereinafter cited
as Incoming Telegram/After the Contract].
This eagerly awaited code was a disappointment to those seeking a "how to do business
with China" handbook. Bosco, supra note 1, at 221. Such fundamental concerns as taxation,
maximum percentage of foreign ownership, profit margins, and types of investment being
sought were left undefined with the result that the ad hoc negotiation process continued. Id.
The only credit given the 1979 Joint Venture Law was that it was a "sweeping statement"
that at least provided a very broad framework. Note, supra note 1, at 145.
Although the 1979 Joint Venture Law was published quickly, it may have purposefully
been limited to general terms. Through this technique, the Chinese could capitalize on any
investment already in existence and at a later date determine the operational details that
they would require of future joint ventures. Note, supra note 1, at 144, 148; see also Sabin,
Negotiation is the Key to Success, Boston Sunday Globe, Oct. 28, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1
(discussion of process of creating legal details through negotiation).
" Carl, Contemporary Law in the People's Republic of China, 32 S.W.L.J. 1255, 1256
(1979). China has never had a tradition of comprehensive national codes. The Conformist,
Buddhist, and Taoist religious beliefs which are strong factors of Chinese life, and the Chi-
nese experience with legalism, both within China and externally, have caused China to steer
away from codified law. See Lee & Lai, The Chinese Conceptions of Law: Confucian Legal-
ist and Buddhist, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1307 (1978).
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who fostered a strong dislike for written laws.' 0 Additionally, the
religious doctrines that permeate China, although not directly fos-
tering a dislike of written laws, end support to the concepts of mu-
tuality of benefits and equality as means of social control. Con-
fucianism teaches that if written law is used to govern society, as
soon as that written law ceases to be operative, society will fail to
obey all rules." Buddhism, the principal religious creed in China,
teaches the concept of compromise. This concept is based on the
belief that in a typical dispute, both parties, from their individual
perspective, are correct in their assertions.'" To maximize these in-
dividual goals, therefore, pursuing a compromise solution is better
than invoking a judicial or individual action that would result in
one party being a loser and the other a winner.13 Had the 1979
Joint Venture Law been intended strictly for domestic use, its lack
of detail would have been fortified by this Chinese practice of mu-
tuality of benefits and equality; 4 however, since the Joint Venture
Law was proposed for international use, its lack of detail has been
viewed as legally ambiguous by potential investors.15
10 During the short-lived Chin dynasty (221-206 B.C.) legalistic thought prevailed. The
legalist emphasized state power and control rather than morality. The legalists' attempts to
control thought consisted of the burying of the 400 scholars and the burning of books. Gan-
schow, supra note 7. The Legalists became symbols of oppression in Chinese history. Mitch-
ell, Dispute Settlement in China, 4 A-S.I.L.S. Irr'L L.J. 71 (1981).
" Confucianism recognizes five relationships upon which behavior is based: affection be-
tween father and son, righteousness between sovereign and subject, respective duties be-
tween husband and wife, order between elder and younger, and sincerity between friend and
friend. Lee & Lai, supra note 9, at 1308-09.
For a discussion of Confucianist beliefs and the role they play in Chinese contracts and
codified laws, see Carl, supra note 9, at 1256; Lee & Lai, supra note 9, at 1308-12; Note,
supra note 2, at 1230-32. For these reasons it is of little surprise that in 1949 the PRC
abolished all laws of the Nationalist government. During the first few years of the Commu-
nist regime, various statutes were enacted, but these statutes did not include commercial,
civil, or criminal codes. P. CHEN, LAW AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN CHINA 2400 B.C. TO
1960 A.D. (1973). Later, in the cultural revolution of 1966, the few written laws and rem-
nants of the Chinese legal profession were abolished. Bosco, supra note 1, at 219; see also S.
TANG & J. MAHONEY, COMMUNIST CHINA. THE SEMESTIc ScENE (1967).
" The major contribution of the Buddhist philosphy was the concept of compromise. See
Carl, supra note 9, at 1256-57.
"3 Id. A solution through compromise, as opposed to a judicial winner-loser situation, al-
lowed each party to maintain dignity and preserved harmony in the community. An elder
was selected to mediate and reach an objective solution. This use of compromise resulted in
the Chinese view of litigation as a disgraceful means of dispute settlement. Id.
,' The concept of mutual benefits and profits not only is known to the Chinese through
their religious and political history but also is supported by the Chinese Communist Party.
One of the essential premises of true Marxism is that all participants benefit equally.
"8 Incoming Telegram/Implementing Regulations, supra note 4, at 1. The informality of
the 1979 Joint Venture Law created uncertainty in the minds of Western investors and was
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Since 1979, the Chinese government has attempted to appease
recalcitrant investors by enacting a number of laws and agree-
ments to clarify Chinese law on joint ventures. 16 Despite these sup-
plements, hesitant investors still felt that significant problems
complicated the operation of joint ventures under the 1979 Joint
Venture Law. 17 The lack of investment, however, did not dampen
viewed as merely a policy statement on future developments in China. See Bosco, supra
note 1, at 221.
Had the response to the law been more in the nature of recognizing a commitment to a
new business structure, the chances of investment may have been greater. Those who fo-
cused upon the lack of detail failed to take into account that in only a few short years the
Chinese have altered, if not discarded, 300 year-old business ways and have adopted a sys-
tem foreign to them. For additional perspective regarding the 1979 Joint Venture Law, see
Note, supra note 3, at 145.
"6 Since the enactment of the Joint Venture Law of 1979, the Chinese have attempted to
explain and supplement the skeletal joint venture law with the following legislation: the
Income Tax Law of the PRC Concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese & Foreign Invest-
ment, Sept. 10, 1980; Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Income
Tax Law, Dec. 14, 1980; Individual Income Tax Law of P.R.C., Sept. 10, 1980; Detailed
Rules for the Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of
China, Dec. 14, 1980; Regulations on Labor Management in Joint Ventures using Chinese
and Foreign Investment, Aug. 26, 1980; Regulations for the Registration of the Joint Ven-
tures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, Aug. 26, 1980; Interim Regulations Concerning
the Resident Offices of Foreign Enterprises, Oct. 30, 1980; Provisional Regulations for Ex-
change Control of the P.R.C., Dec. 18, 1980; Detailed Regulations for the Implementation of
Exchange Control with Respect to Foreign Representative Offices and Their Employees,
Aug. 10, 1981; Rules Governing the Carrying of Foreign Exchange, Precious Metals and Pay-
ment Instruments in Convertible Currency into or out of China, Aug. 10, 1981; Detailed
Rules and Regulations on Exchange Control Relating to Individuals, Dec. 1981; Economic
Contract Law, Dec. 13, 1981; Regulations on Special Economic Zones in Guandang Province,
Aug. 26, 1980; Provisional Regulations for Business Registration (Guandang Special Eco-
nomic Zone), Jan. 1, 1982; Provisional Labor and Wage Regulations (Guandang Special Eco-
nomic Zone), Jan. 1, 1982; Feasibility Study Elements (no date supplied). Trade Report,
supra note 1, at 37-99. In relation to the United States, the Chinese have made further
attempts to end the ambiguities of the Joint Venture Law by assenting to legal frameworks
between the PRC and the United States that purport to explain further the Chinese expec-
tation of joint ventures. Trade Agreement, Feb. 1, 1980; Maritime Agreement, Sept. 17,
1980; Aviation Agreement, Sept. 17, 1980; Textile Agreements, Sept. 17, 1980; Consulate
Agreements, Sept. 17, 1980; Extension of Eximbank, Apr. 1980; Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corp. (OPIC), Oct. 7, 1980; Approval of Certain Military and Technology Sales, July
1981; Revised Licensing Guidelines, July 1980; U.S. Granted China Preferential Administra-
tive Treatment, July 1980; U.S. Issued Regulations on Sales to China, Dec. 1981, See Trade
Report, supra note 1, at 4-6.
17 Although the Chinese believed that these laws and agreements would clear up ambigui-
ties surrounding the joint venture law, foreign investors still steered away, complaining that
some areas continued to be vague. For example, in the area of arbitration, despite the Chi-
nese reputation for strict adherence to their contractual obligations, investors felt that the
PRC failed to provide adequate enforcement guarantees, since the Chinese would not set
out a guarantee or procedure for arbitration awards. Note, supra note 3, at 142-44. Another
example is in the area of patent and property rights. Foreign investors believed that the lack
of a "discernible enforcement mechanism" for property rights was still an obstacle to tech-
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China's desire for international trade, 8 so China again attempted
to reform its business and legal policies. The issuance of the 1983
Implementing Regulations was an attempt to clarify the 1979 Joint
Venture Law and invite investment from abroad, clearly evidenc-
ing this ideological shift.
The first function of the Implementing Regulations, clarifying
the Joint Venture Law, is met through many facets of the regula-
tions, but discussion will be limited to two clarifying measures.
First, the manner in which the Implementing Regulations are or-
ganized and printed, as compared with the law they modify, indi-
cates a change in the Chinese approach to business-oriented laws.
The text of the 1979 Joint Venture Law consisted of fifteen cryptic
articles; the new Implementing Regulations contain 118 articles. 9
Second, while the format of the 1979 Joint Venture Law was
merely a sporadic listing of unrelated rules,20 the Implementing
Regulations are not only set out in sixteen subject-based chapters,
but also are subcategorized. 2' The length of the new Implementing
nology transfers. Note, supra note 1, at 146.
A final complaint by investors was that even though the new laws and regulations pro-
vided details, investors were still unsure as to exactly how, and when these new laws and
regulations would work in conjunction with the 1979 Joint Venture Law. See Trade Report,
supra note 1, at 14-16.
18 See Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1983, at 5, col. 1. Since 1979, a variety of laws have been
published to promote trade, and they apparently have been successful. During the last dec-
ade China has had an eight-fold growth in foreign trade; trade levels went from $4.3 billion
in 1970 to $34 billion in 1980, and it is estimated that trade levels will reach $63 billion by
1985. Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 1, at 810-11.
The 1983 Implementing Regulations also evidence China's growing appetite for trade. Ar-
ticle 4(2) seeks enterprises that need minimal investment yet produce quick returns and fast
profits - a somewhat capitalist notion of business. See Implementing Regulations, supra
note 5, art. 4(2); see also id. art. 12.
The re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 1976 between the United States and
China caused a new Chinese approach toward relations with the West. In January 1979,
Premier Deng Ziaopeng toured the United States. Following that tour, in March 1979, $197
million in American claims which had existed since the 1949 Communist freeze on all west-
ern assets in China were liquidated. The Chinese showed their eagerness to trade with the
West when they published the 1979 Joint Venture Law. The United States response was
demonstrated by Senate approval of H.R. Con. Res. 204, which extended Most Favored
Nation status to the PRC, on January 24, 1980. 126 CONG. REc. 5348-51 (daily ed. Jan. 24,
1980). For an in-depth analysis of the PRC's transition from Mao, see Bosco, supra note 1,
at 218-23. For a discussion on the handling of the liquidation of claims, see Wash. Post,
Mar. 2, 1979, at Al, col. 1. For an overview of this modern transitory phase of PRC history
which has been marked by increased Chinese willingness to adopt more written rules of law,
see Note, supra note 1, at 133-34.
" Trade Report, supra note 1, at app. A.
20 Id.
" Incoming Telegram/Implementing Regulations, supra note 4.
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Regulations and their division into subject matter-based chapters
may be incidental, but it suggests an attempt by the Chinese gov-
ernment to move toward a legal system that is clearer and more
closely aligned with international practices.22
In the realm of substantive law, the 1979 Joint Venture Law
failed to illuminate fully many elements of a joint venture. The
Implementing Regulations attempt to supplement the law in all
these areas,2" but a review of only the joint venture formation pro-
22 Actually, much of the procedural details of joint ventures have already been provided
through legislation and agreements which came into force after the publication of the 1979
Joint Venture Law. Since many of these laws did not specifically state that joint ventures
were subject to these laws, however, the relationship between the joint ventures and the new
rule was unknown. The Implementing Regulations provide some guidelines as to how the
laws interrelate. For example, taxing of joint venture personnel is under the jurisdiction of
the Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China, Sept. 10, 1980. See Im-
plementing Regulations, supra note 5, art. 70.
Other methods besides the Implementing Regulations have been used to clarify the 1979
Joint Venture Law and to prompt investment. In light of the generally strong business ties
between China and Japan, concern arose over the failure of Japanese businesses to exploit
the China joint venture opportunity. This arousal of government concern in Japan led to a
MITI-sponsored investment survey in April 1984. The MITI-sponsored investment survey,
staffed mostly by specialists from the Japan-China Association of Economy and Trade, was
dispatched to China to discuss Japan's perceived obstacles to further joint venture activity.
The result of this investment survey was the identification of seven impediments to joint
ventures as seen by the Japanese. The Japanese feel that through this survey, the publica-
tion of the Implementing Regulations, and other accords made by China, some of these
obstacles have been weakened. Incoming Telegram/Japan, supra note 5, at 1.
The MITI-sponsored survey designated these seven factors as investment impediments to
all foreign joint venture partners: (1) terms of the joint venture, (2) lack of legal framework,
(3) inaccessibility to the Chinese market, (4) high cost of land use, (5) forced use of Chinese
components, (6) control of business decisions, and (7) excessive regulation and paperwork.
Id. at 1-3.
By creating a legal system similar to the system currently practiced in the West, the Chi-
nese perhaps believe that Western investors would feel more familiar with China and will be
more inclined to invest. This attempt to imitate Western laws has been urged upon- the
Chinese by investors and lawyers who are seeking uniformity and standard forms of busi-
ness in the PRC. Note, supra note 3, at 144. Some commentators feel that until the Chinese
adopt a Western-oriented system, investors will suffer great losses. See Bosco, supra note 1,
at 240-41.
Prior to the Implementing Regulations, there was debate over both the lack of detail and
the interpretation of the details provided. In their effort to understand the ramifications of
a joint venture in China, many authorities have even debated the validity of translations of
the 1979 Joint Venture Law. For example, the Chinese word "ying" has been translated into
English by some as "might" and by others as "must." This particular debate has led to what
is termed a "lawyer's nightmare." Bosco, supra note 1, at 225 n.34. See also ROWLEY, FAR
EAST ECON. REV. 50 (1979) (discussion of other interpretations and implications of the word
"ying"). The Chinese hope to avoid debates such as these by supplying a glossary. Commen-
tators have previously stated that not until the language of Chinese law is standardized and
mutually understood will investment increase. Bosco, supra note 1, at 224-25.
2U The MITI group found several impediments exclusive to Japan: (1) Chinese prejudice,
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cess is sufficient for determining whether the Implementing Regu-
lations are fully capable of satisfying this clarifying purpose. 4
The 1979 Joint Venture Law barely defined the joint venture
formation process. Only one article touched upon the formation
process,2 5 and this article provided merely a short outline. Under
the 1979 Joint Venture Law the joint venture parties had to sub-
mit agreement documents to the Foreign Investment Commission
(FIC).26 Within three months, the FIC would approve or deny the
joint venture.27 Upon FIC approval, the joint venture could register
for an operating license with the General Administration for the
Industry and Commerce of the People's Republic of China (GAIC).
Once the license was received, production could begin.28 The law
failed to enunciate the particular department responsible for the
registration of joint ventures, the time span for registration, and a
number of other factors relevant to joint venture formation. By
comparison, the new Implementing Regulations devote an entire
chapter to the formation of a joint venture.2 9 In addition, requi-
sites for joint venture approval, controlling government authority,
required documentation, applicable law, and estimates of timing
are all illuminated in the new Implementing Regulations.
Under the new regulations, before a joint venture can begin op-
eration it must first secure approval from the proper PRC agency.
Whereas the 1979 Joint Venture Law failed to disclose clearly the
proper PRC agency, the new regulations designate MOFERT as
(2) Japanese business practices, and (3) alternative yet satisfactory business arrangements
already in operation between China and Japan. Incoming Telegram/Japan, supra note 5, at
3-5.
"4 The formation process of a joint venture in China is not necessarily more important
than other areas of operation, but the remainder of the relationship is planned during this
phase. See generally Incoming Telegram/After the Contract, supra note 8.
, Trade Report, supra note 1, at app. A., art. 3.
SO Id. Article 3 fails to supply the criteria upon which the Foreign Investment Com-
misssion (FIC) and General Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People's Re-
public of China (GAIC) based their decision to authorize or deny a proposed joint venture.
Bosco, supra note 1, at 224; Klingensberg & Pattison, supra note 1, at 820; see also infra
notes 35, 36 and accompanying text.
'7 The purpose of the approval and registration requirements of the FIC and GAIC is to
ensure that both China and foreign investor thoroughly consider the joint venture, for "re-
view will effectuate the extra degree of clarification needed in such cross-cultural endeav-
ors." Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 1, at 821. However, since the 1979 Joint Venture
Law did not disclose any of the requirements for a positive decision by the FIC and GAIC
(supra note 26), the decision on the sufficiency of the "cross-cultural endeavor" was left
entirely in the hands of the Chinese. Id.
" Trade Report, supra note 1, at app. A, art. 3.
" Implementing Regulations, supra note 5, arts. 8-18.
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the national-level ministry empowered to supervise joint ven-
tures.30 The regulations note that in certain statutorily specified
situations, a local government department office can act as the di-
rect supervising authority.31
The Implementing Regulations also provide potential investors
with a second significant formation feature-approval criteria.32
30 Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations on Trade (MOFERT) replaces FIC and GAIC,
as the sole national administrative office over joint venture approval and operations. Id. art.
8.
Although the Implementing Regulations have put foreign investers on notice as to the
"national" authority over joint ventures, they fail to address or alleviate problems which
exist due to the extensive "departmentalization" of authority in the Chinese bureaucracy.
The different levels of bureaucracy, accountability, and responsibility have made contract
negotiations difficult and eventual enforcement of contract terms equally complicated.
A 1984 United States Department of Commerce survey of three American businesses op-
erating in Shanghai confirmed that serious problems exist due to the faceting within the
Chinese bureaucracy. Though the Americans working in Shanghai feel that the Chinese
honor their contracts (and are punctilious in holding the United States party to its obliga-
tions), all have found their Chinese counterparts are limited in their ability to meet their
own responsibilities. As one said:
In the negotiations, they kept insisting that equipment and materials were availa-
ble in China and should be subtracted from what we were to supply. Then, when
we are all set to do something, we suddenly find it isn't available. The troops that
we do business with at the lower levels, who are not part of the negotiations, can-
not get the stuff. You finally wind up having to get it for them.
Authority and responsibility in China are so compartmentalized that, in the sit-
uation just described, the Chinese client was unable to procure materials outside
its own bureaucratic "system," where it has no priority claim on scare supplies.
The Chinese organization which negotiated the contract was an import-export cor-
poration under the ministry of foreign trade; the negotiators made contractual
commitments on behalf of a Chinese corporation in a totally separate "system"
under an industrial ministry, without knowing whether the corporation could ac-
tually fulfill these responsibilities.
In China's compartmentalized system, commitments made without authority
will not necessarily be honored by the entity which has control. Moreover, discov-
ering who does have authority is an ad hoc process for the Chinese as well as for
the expatriate. In fact, the situation is so complex that probably no one has full
knowledge. One American engineer recounted, '[o]ne of our biggest difficulties has
been to find the person on the Chinese side who can make a commitment. Unless
you have a particular individual's commitment, we'll ignore what someone else on
the Chinese side might have said. Furthermore, they won't necessarily admit that
they can't make the commitment.' In addition, authority over some matters may
lie with more than one organization.
Incoming Telegram/After the Contract, supra note 8, at 1-3.
3' Implementing Regulations, supra note 5, arts. 8-18. Although this provision attempts
to localize the operation and authority over a joint venture, problems will still exist because
not all facets of the joint venture are contained within the local area or authority. Access to
raw materials, labor requirements, and distribution processes are just a few of many facets
of a joint venture operation which are under national, not local, control. See id.
3' Id. arts. 3, 4, 5. In Art. 3 of the Implementing Regulations, the Chinese government
lists the six business areas which it feels will produce the best "socialist modernization."
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The previous law failed to specify any particular types of ventures
the Chinese found especially desirable. In contrast, the Implement-
ing Regulations specify the purposes, the economic potential, and
the industrial areas 3 and capabilities for which China is currently
seeking joint ventures. These factors will influence the FIC/
MOFERT decision to approve or disapprove a joint venture appli-
cation. Also, the Implementing Regulations list certain types of
joint ventures that will be denied the right to operate. 3
A third formation feature clarified by the new Implementing
Regulations is the requirements for documenting a joint venture.36
Three agreement documents are involved in a joint venture forma-
tion: the joint venture contract, the joint venture agreement, and
the articles of association. The Implementing Regulations distin-
guish these three documents" by designating the most essential
documents,3 7 specifying particular facts that must be included in
the documents,3 8 establishing language requirements, 9 and as-
signing responsibilities to the parties during the application pro-
cess.40 Considering that contract negotiations are generally the ini-
Article 4 lists the economic results that a joint venture must stress to receive approval.
Article 5 lists the elements of a joint venture which preclude approval by MOFERT.
33 Along with those industrial areas listed in the Implementing Regulations, the Chinese
gave the MITI Group (supra note 22) a list of nine industries for which it desired joint
venture proposals, including transportation, energy, metallurgy, machinery, electronics,
new-type construction materials, non-ferrous metals, rare metals, and agriculture. Most ex-
isting joint ventures are in the light industry, spinning, machinery, and electronics areas,
which may be a guide for future investment.
34 Id. art. 5.
SO See Implementing Regulations, supra note 5, arts. 9, 13, 14, and 17 (complete outline of
the documentation requirements).
" Id. art. 13.
37 See supra note 20.
" Implementing Regulations, supra note 5, art. 14.
39 Id. art. 9.
40 Id. art. 12. Respective responsibility during the application process is certainly impor-
tant, but there are other aspects of responsibility which joint venture parties should be
aware of. For instance, in an effort to protect themselves later, contractors should be wary of
"bureaucratic obstruction" in China.
If the experience of the United States engineering firms in Shanghai suggests
any lesson for future business negotiations, it is that a contract should be written
to minimize penalties for delays caused by bureaucratic obstruction. Bureaucracy
is pervasive and authority so fragmented that there is no effective project sched-
ule, which frustrates most Americans working in Shanghai. One employee whose
company is supplying technical assistance to a Shanghai client said:
[O]ne of the major problems is that we can't find the schedule. Officially they
did not change the schedule, but we know they're behind schedule. We will proba-
bly all go home as scheduled, because our contract is based on total man-months
in China, not on their progress. If we knew what the new schedule is, we could
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tial source of contact between China and joint venture investors,
and that the contract later acts as a guideline to future expecta-
tions,41 the Implementing Regulations' assistance of foreign inves-
probably have [made more efficient use of our people's time in China].
Incoming Telegram/After the Contract, supra note 8, at 3. A well negotiated contract may
be able to protect the investors from incurring liability due to "bureaucratic obstruction."
"An observer of Chinese commercial negotiating style has commented that for the
Chinese, conclusion of a contract means that the two parties now understand each
other well enough that each can expect further favors from the other .. " One of
the United States engineers working in Shanghai noted his client's tendency to
ask for services not specified in the contract "in the spirit of cooperation," i.e., for
no additional fee. The Chinese client may hold quite a different view from the
American party about what constitutes a "favor" or concession, and what is owed
by one party to the other. For example, one of the Americans working in Shanghai
remarked that the Chinese do not recognize or reward delivery of a product which
exceeds the specification agreed to in the contract Another commented:
Like many American companies, we were anxious to get a foot in the
door, so (the Chinese client) got a good deal. But we're actively negotiat-
ing for a couple more jobs, and the problem we have is, they think the
second will be cheaper than the first, and we're thinking the opposite:
with our foot in the door, we'll charge a normal profit.
The experience of American engineering companies in Shanghai indicates that the
more complete and detailed the contract, the easier for the man in the field to
resist the client's request for such "favors." One U.S. company now working in
Shanghai offered the Chinese a contract package similar to one the company was
using in Third World and East Bloc countries. With that background, the com-
pany was able to define the scope of work precisely.
Incoming Telegram/After the Contract, supra note 8, at 2.
In light of the Chinese understanding of a "contract," and the expectations that arise
from a contract, any data that the Implementing Regulations provide on the contract nego-
tiation and operation should be of assistance to potential investors.
Another facet of a contract that cannot be underestimated is how the contract covers the
living situation of employees sent by the foreign investor to China.
The Chinese system tends to put the expatriate in a position of dependency, his
sponsoring unit taking responsibility for his personal situation vis-a-vis the multi-
tude of bureaucracies which impinge on his life in China. Many Americans find
the dependency itself frustrating, doubly so when the 'sponsor' seems inadequate
to discharge these responsibilities. Most of those now here have found, however,
that they gradually outgrow this dependence and learn to fend for themselves. At
a minimum, a contract should clarify the employee's visa and customs status.
This subject falls into contractual limbo because housing, visa status, and cus-
toms privileges are beyond control of the Chinese organization which is the party
to the contract and must be negotiated with organizations which are outside its
"system." The Chinese client or partner of the United States company, as its
sponsor, represents it in these negotiations (usually leaving the company in the
dark about what is going on). However, many of the American engineers resident
in Shanghai believe their sponsors were naive themselves about the regulations
and failed to investigate before the expatriates arrived. As a result, they uninten-
tionally misled the United States companies about conditions for their employees
in China.
Id. at 4. For a general discussion of other problems that foreign business representatives
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tors' understanding of Chinese expectations is certainly a step to-
ward improved business relations.
Other aspects of joint venture formation are further clarified by
the Implementing Regulations. As for related and applicable law,
clauses in the Implementing Regulations put potential investors on
notice of the relationship between previously enacted Chinese laws
and the total body of law regulating joint ventures.42 These clauses
attempt to provide investors with a breakdown of how China's laws
will affect joint venture operation.
Finally, the Implementing Regulations substantially clarify the
approximate time span of the registration process. 4 During the
three-month period during which MOFERT reviews the joint ven-
ture application, the parties are free to amend the documentation
originally submitted. 4 The regulations provide one month for an
approved joint venture to apply for a license with the FIC."4 For
contract and agreement purposes, the date that the operations li-
cense is issued serves as the official date of the establishment of
the joint venture."6
Additional substantive Implementing Regulations address the
formation registration process of joint ventures, as well as other,
previously vague areas. These regulations provide detailed infor-
mation on the selection of the board of directors, 7 access to raw
materials, 8 the role of officers and managers,"9 the jurisdiction for
face in Shanghai, see id. at 4-6.
42 Implementing Regulations, supra note 5, arts. 1, 26, 29, 69, 70, 73, 91, 96, 100.
43 Id. arts. 10, 11.
41 Id. arts. 8, 10.
45 Id. art. 11.
41 Id. art. 11. Again, the mere inclusion of the time schedule for amending the joint ven-
ture documents during the application and registration process evidences the increased em-
phasis on detail in the Implementing Regulations.
47 Implementing Regulations, supra note 5, arts. 33-41.
46 Article 57 of the Implementing Regulations states that joint ventures must preferen-
tially use Chinese components and raw materials if available. Reaction to this clause is va-
ried, but Japanese investors find this clause an impediment to investment. The reasoning is
that:
[gliven the fledgling state of China's industrialization, these parts are often of
inferior quality; despite this fact, the joint venture will be charged the internation-
ally prevailing price. This means the foreign investor can be squeezed on one side
by Chinese determination of production costs (both fixed and variable) and on the
other by Chinese setting of the selling price.
Incoming Telegram/Japan, supra note 5, at 3; see also Implementing Regulations, supra
note 5, arts. 58, 59.
The Japanese investors have noted that this raw material requirement can have repercus-
sions both in China and on the sale of products destined for export into a competitive mar-
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arbitration, 0 the methods of accounting and finance, 5' and other
areas that needed clarification.
With the ambiguities in the 1979 law clarified, the major concern
of the Chinese government is whether this clarification will en-
courage foreign investment in China.5 2 There are a variety of as-
pects of business in China about which potential investors consid-
ering investments in China need further information when
deciding whether to invest in China. In some of the traditionally
primary" areas of business concerns, such as taxation, labor, and
market access, the Implementing Regulations expand Chinese law,
making it more precise and, therefore, more attractive to investors.
For the sake of analysis of the investment incentive function of the
Implementing Regulations, discussion will be limited to these spe-
cific business areas.
Generally, one of the most important methods of attracting for-
ket. The Japanese are dismayed by the effect of certain Chinese materials on their quality
control standards. "As part of the bilateral exchange of personnel, the Japanese have
trained some Chinese in quality control principles, but these trainees cannot always con-
vince Chinese bureaucrats that buying components abroad may be preferable to supporting
domestic industry. As a result, this is another factor discouraging Japanese investment."
Incoming Telegram/Japan, supra note 5, at 3.
49 Implementing Regulations, supra note 5, arts. 33-41.
'o Id. arts. 109-12.
81 Id. arts. 80-90.
' The Chinese issued the 1983 Implementing Regulations to promote foreign investment
by clearing up the previous legal ambiguities. Incoming Telegram/Implementing Regula-
tions, supra note 4, at 1. For a discussion of loan areas under the 1979 Joint Venture Law
that were strictly limited to negotiation, and hence ambiguous to some investors, see Bosco,
supra note 1, at 224. For a discussion of specific areas of business that may not be fully
defined in the Implementing Regulations, see also id.; Klingenburg & Pattison, supra note
1, at 808-09; Note, supra note 3, at 147-48.
58 Another "primary" attraction of a joint venture in China is a low cost of production
due to the key element of inexpensive land. Such has not been the case, however.
The Chinese government . . . has set land prices quite high, both when fixing
rent and when assessing land as a capital contribution to a joint venture. Since all
land is state-owned, no other price mechanism to restrain government determina-
tion exists. A range of rental fees is provided in local statutes, leaving the exact
charge to negotiations between the parties. The April MITI mission complained
about high rents and the Chinese promised further discussions, apparently recog-
nizing the danger of discouraging joint venture business.
Land assessment as a contribution to the Joint Venture is handled somewhat
differently. Japanese businesses have complained of a Chinese tendency to assess
the land so as to match the capital contribution made by the foreign investor,
thereby neatly achieving at least 50% ownership and control. The 1983 Supple-
mentary Regulations to the joint venture law took a step forward, however, by
giving responsibility for assessments to the central government, facilitating a
standarization of the process.
Incoming Telegram/Japan, supra note 5, at 2.
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eign investment is by creating a favorable tax environment." The
1979 Joint Venture Law provided a general scheme of tax rules,55
but it was not clear whether this cursory scheme would benefit for-
eign business investments. The 1980 Chinese Income Tax Law sup-
plemented the general tax section of the Joint Venture Law, but
investment still fell short of expectations .5 To remedy this lack of
investment, the Implementing Regulations now not only assist po-
tential investors in measuring the effect that the previously-en-
acted tax laws could have on joint ventures, 57 but also they state
certain joint venture conditions that will give rise to tax reductions
and exemptions."8 Yet, even with this addition of tax details, two
Taxation considerations play a major role in determining the structure that a joint
venture will take. Flicker, Western Joint Ventures to Carry Out Industrial Cooperation
Agreements in the Soviet Union: Selected Problems for United States Parties, 13 INT'L L.
485, 490 (1979). For an overview of the United States tax treatment of various types of joint
ventures and the effect of the United States-U.S.S.R. income tax on the joint venture struc-
ture, see id. at 490-93.
A dichotomy exists in reference to the Joint Venture Law ambiguities. The ambiguity
concerning taxation can be viewed as a facet "flexible enough to accommodate almost any
scheme," or a provision guaranteeing firm Chinese control. See Note, supra note 3, at 149-
50.
56 See Trade Report, supra note 1, at app. A, art. 7. The 1979 Joint Venture Law pro-
vided that the joint venture will pay an income tax on gross profits pursuant to the PRC's
tax laws and that upon reinvestment, restitution of a portion of the paid income tax would
be allowed. The 1979 Joint Venture Law failed to provide the tax rates or the percentage of
restitution. Note, supra note 3, at 136-37. At the time the 1979 Joint Venture Law had been
issued there was in China an extensive amount of tax law already in existence, but the 1979
Joint Venture Law failed to enumerate how these previously enacted laws would affect joint
venture operations.
" Problems still existed in many vital areas of taxation; for example, what might qualify
as a legitimate contribution to capital might not qualify for tax relief. Surrency & Sable,
Chinese Removing Joint Venture Barriers, Legal Times of Wash., Oct. 2, 1979 at 2. For a
review of the tax incentives of joint ventures, see Note, supra note 3, at 137. For the manner
of tax deductions in reference to the expansion reserve fund, bonus and welfare funds, see
Klingenburg & Pattison, supra note 1, at 829. For a discussion of the tax scheme when the
joint venture is no longer operating at a loss and no longer exempt from taxation, see id. For
a discussion of whether the joint venture will be subject to China's Industrial and Commer-
cial Consolidation Tax, see Note, supra note 1, at 137. Tax laws that issued subsequent to
the 1979 Joint Venture Law filled in some gaps in the law by, among other things, providing
more precise definitions and terms and spelling out how taxable income is to be calculated.
Trade Report, supra note 1, at 13; see supra note 14. The laws also informed investors of
accounting procedures and the relationship between municipality tax laws. Trade Report,
supra note 1, at 13-14.
17 See Implementing Regulations, supra note 5. The 1979 Joint Venture Law failed to
resolve whether a joint venture would be liable for other Chinese taxes; this Implementing
Regulation chapter helps resolve the liability questions. Trade Report, supra note 1, at 12-
13.
8 Article 7 of the 1979 Joint Venture Law (Trade Report, supra note 1, at app. x) per-
mitted a partial refund of taxes when a foreign partner reinvested any or all of its net profit
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tax questions remain: first, how much of a reduction or exemption
is permissive, and second, are these specified situations the only
situations in which reductions and exemptions will be allowed. 59
The answers to these and other tax questions will not be found
in the Implementing Regulations, but may only be developed
through direct negotiations.60 A foreign investor perhaps should
view the current tax regulations as merely a negotiating base,
rather than an enforcement mechanism upon which to base
claims." Codified laws, which are still new to China, must be used
in conjunction with the traditional methods of problem solving.62
Thus, potential investors who prefer to see black-letter law explic-
itly define the allowable rate of tax reductions may view the Imple-
mentation Regulations as providing inadequate incentives to in-
vest.63 On the other hand, investors who use the Implementing
Regulations as a negotiating base and trust their own negotiating
skills and position may view the Implementing Regulations as an
opportunity to reach a most advantageous taxation agreement.6 '
"within Chinese territory," but its language failed to articulate whether the phrase required
reinvestment to take place through the joint venture. Due to this failure to articulate terms,
any tax refund in this area must be determined and organized through negotiations. See
Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 1, at 828-29; see also note 21 (discussion of some of the
hazards of negotiating). The Implementing Regulations attempt to define more clearly when
these refunds are permissible. Incoming Telegram/Implementing Regulations, supra note 4,
arts. 71, 72.
" See supra note 47.
" When negotiating a contract it must be remembered that this loose amalgamation of
contract principles has survived for years because it centers around concepts of informal
negotiations and, most importantly, good faith on the part of the negotiators. See Hoff-
heimer, Law and Modernization in China: The Juridical Behavior of the Chinese Commu-
nists, 7 GA. J. INT'L & Com. L. 515, 530-50; Lee, Chinese Communist Law: Its Background
and Development, 60 MICH. L. REv. 439, 472 (1962). For example, the lack of provisions
relating to breach of contract or employee wages is probably based upon assumed good faith
in contractual obligations, rather than any attempt to gain unfair advantage over the foreign
trading partner. Supra note 3, at 652.
1 Ganschow Address, supra note 7. See also generally Incoming Telegram/After the Con-
tract, supra note 8.
" See Lee, supra note 60 for discussion.
" Overall, many other factors come into play here, therefore, some investors would rather
rely on a tax scheme that is less ambiguous and provides more definite tax incentives. Letter
from Leo Carter of Solo Cup Co. to Eileen M. Golden (Oct. 31, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Carter Letter]. See generally supra note 7.
" Given that the applicable tax scheme is a major factor in a joint venture, all potential
investors will be concerned with its provisions. See Flicker, supra note 54, at 490-93. Some
investors will see a loosely defined tax system as one in which an advantage can be negoti-
ated. Interview with Thomas Schoenbaum, Director of the Dean Rusk Center, University of
Georgia School of Law, Athens, Ga. (November 1983). These investors recognize that it may
be possible to negotiate some tax breaks, but the tax aspects are certainly not touted as
[Vol. 15:389
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In addition to the creation of a favorable tax environment, an-
other important aspect of a joint venture operation capable of pro-
ducing investment incentives is labor." The 1979 Joint Venture
Law left procedures covering the employment and discharge of
workers and staff members completely subject to joint venture ne-
gotiations.86 The 1979 Joint Venture Law was, further, silent in the
essential areas of labor quantity, labor quality, and wage rate
structures. In 1980, the PRC published regulations addressing
many of these sensitive labor issues.1 In an effort to make Chinese
joint ventures attractive to Western investors, the Implementing
Regulations address other signficant labor concerns, such as the re-
lationship between labor and managment,68 trade union participa-
tion in joint venture operations, 9 and even a salary bonus system
based on a somewhat capitalist, "more work-more pay" concept.70
These regulations, in conjunction with the previous labor laws and
regulations, should, at least in theory, assist potential investors in
understanding the impact that the Chinese labor system would
have on joint venture operations.7 1
Conceptually, few labor problems would inhibit foreign invest-
ment in China, but some problems may frustrate the actual execu-
something to attract one to a joint venture with China. See Carter Letter supra note 63.
65 Another way investors hope to exploit joint venture opportunities is by employing
lower paid Chinese workers. Incoming Telegram/Japan, supra note 5, at 2. In addition to
the use of the site (see supra.note 52), the only significant operational contribution that the
Chinese can make to the joint venture is labor. Trade Report, supra note 1, at 15. In refer-
ence to the original contributions to the joint venture, the Chinese are seeking technology,
capital, equipment, and business skill; thus, use of the site and labor appear to be the only
initial investments outstanding after the foreign contribution. Id.
66 See id. app. A, art. 10.
07 Regulations on Labor Management in Joint Ventures Using Foreign Investment, 26
Aug. 1980, official translation printed in id. at 56. These regulations technically give employ-
ers a "good deal of latitude in the hiring, training, disciplining, and dismissal of workers."
Id. at 14. This latitude is based on the contract between the joint venture and the appropri-
ate trade union or employee. Id. at 14-15.
68 Implementing Regulations, supra note 5, arts. 91-94.
66 Id. arts. 95-99.
70 Id. art. 93. In reference to Chinese workers, Article 93 codifies the responsibility sys-
tem: "Each according to his work, and more for those who work more." Incoming Telegram/
Implementing Regulations, supra note 4, at 2. "This change or clarification of the labor
work incentive, increased pay, is viewed as a significant step in encouraging foreign invest-
ment in China." Id. at 1.
71 As for the pay scale of the Chinese worker in a joint venture, Chinese regulations "re-
quire joint ventures to pay wages 20-50% above the domestic rate, depending on the
worker's skill level." Incoming Telegram/Japan, supra note 5, at 2-3. The actual wages paid
to Chinese employees will most often be officially determined during contract negotiations.
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tion of the labor laws.7 ' First, some joint venture participants have
felt that they did not have the power to dismiss a poor worker, and
the Implementing Regulations do not remedy such a problem.73
Second, the Implementing Regulations fail to provide an adequate
guide for measuring the impact that trade unions might have upon
the management of a joint venture. 4 A foreign investor will be par-
ticularly conscious of this concern because a trade union may in
reality be an arm of the PRC government. 75 Third, the Chinese
government has not made its labor supply significantly more at-
tractive to foreign investors than the labor forces of other de-
veloping countries competing for the same industrial investments.
China is only one of many nations offering inexpensive labor as an
incentive for investment.76  When compared with some South
American, African, and other Asian nations, the Chinese labor pool
7' Some labor problems that foreign investors face in China are not capable of being
solved through laws or regulations. For example, Chinese work practices are another source
of criticism by the American engineers on site in Shanghai: "It's an unsafe work environ-
ment. There's junk all over, and so many people, most of them sitting down watching. All of
the basic construction is pretty low level. The people are doing a pretty good job, but they
had to be taught everything to our standards. And it's difficult to get them to maintain it."
Incoming Telegram/After the Contract, supra note 8, at 4.
Another basic difference Americans find in the Chinese work style is the lack of
confidentiality. None of those now working in Shanghai entrusts confidential mat-
ters to Chinese secretaries or assistants, and all assume that their letter, telephone
and telex communications are public knowledge. One American explained that be-
cause privacy is not respected, the Chinese themselves act to defend their own
confidential affairs against intrusion in ways the American finds inimical to the
functioning of the organization. "We refurbished all of the offices. The next day,
there was paper over all the windows on the doors into the offices. I asked why,
and they said, 'so nobody can peek in."
Id. Solutions to difficulties of this kind can only be resolved through knowledge of the Chi-
nese labor force and legitimate American expectations.
" "Although joint ventures normally have the right to hire and fire, many say that in
practice the ventures have no such authority: 'You can't hire and fire on your own no matter
what they say.'" Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 1983, col. 2-3. See Incoming Telegram/Implementing
Regulations, supra note 4, at 2; see also Trade Report, supra note 1, app. A, arts. 6 & 11,
(regulations dealing with staff workers and other personnel contracts).
As for management personnel, Article 41 of the Implementing Regulations "permits the
dismissal of officers for graft, or serious dereliction of duty." Due to this high threshold for
dismissal, incompetence, by inference, may have to be tolerated. Id. at 2.
' Carter Letter, supra note 63.
' "Faced with operations in a nation so heavily structured around labor while often bas-
ing much of a venture's program upon relatively low labor costs, the venture participants
are likely to raise questions concerning the use and treatment of personnel." Klingenberg &
Pattison, supra note 1, at 826.
" China possesses an abundance of both natural and human resources. Note, supra note
3, at 116.
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suffers from a serious language barrier, cultural unfamiliarity,77
differing professional standards, 78 and a vast lack of contact with
the Western world. To encourage investors to select the Chinese
labor force over the labor forces of nations with which investors are
familiar, the Chinese government may have to grant investors ma-
jor concessions to balance the risks the foreign investor would
assume.
A final major concern of most potential investors and perhaps
the most promising investment incentive is market accessibility. 79
Usually a foreign investor will provide the developing country with
technology,80 management skills,81 and the use of foreign currency,
77 A 1984 United States Department of Commerce publication reviewed the cultural ties
of China and how these ties affected the joint venture operations with many nations. It
stated that in comparison, several factors make the Japanese experience different from the
American one.
The close cultural ties between the two Asian nations give Japanese businesmen
[sic] a potential headstart when investing in China, but also have their drawbacks.
Japanese negotiators complain of a prejudice on the part of the Chinese which
causes them to favor Westerners over Japanese. The Chinese, it is claimed, con-
cede terms to Americans which they will not concede to Japanese. The Chinese
may openly discriminate. For example, China pays an absence fee to foreign com-
panies as compensation for the lost services of technicians sent to China. This fee
is less for Japanese and Koreans than for Americans. In sum, despite the breadth
of their crucial 'hands on' experience in China, the Japanese perceive themselves
as at a disadvantage when dealing with the Chinese.
Incoming Telegram/Japan, supra note 5, at 3.
78 See generally Incoming Telegram/After the Contract, supra note 8, at 2-3.
'9 "Access to the Chinese domestic market is the goal of most foreign investors, who hope
that joint venture arrangements will win them preferential entree [sic] to this huge cus-
tomer pool. The Chinese, however, often permit this investment because of its export poten-
tial and try to convert production into foreign exchange." Incoming Telegram/Japan, supra
note 5, at 3.
80 See supra note 32. The Japanese have already determined what forms of technology
they plan to export.
81 Teaching management skills is not an easy operation. Some Americans have already
been involved in teaching management methods to Shanghai clients. The American manager
of one project described the problems of changing Chinese management practices in these
terms:
They accept new ways of management in principle, but they have difficulty put-
ting them into practice. The biggest problem is that they don't know how to de-
fine what a problem is. The reasons for a failure have never been accepted or
explored. It's the old 'face' thing. Management doesn't want to hear about uncer-
tainties or failures, only accomplished facts . . . They don't work together as a
good team. Part of the problem we've had is getting them to work together; we've
had to force them to hold meetings where everybody who should be present is
present . . . They don't like to get into a meeting where they have to talk about
problems. No one will commit to anything until the problem's been solved. That's
been the toughest thing to try to change.
Incoming Telegram/After the Contract, supra note 8, at 4.
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while the developing nation in turn supplies cheap labor.8 2 Some-
times the developing country's supply of labor may be inadequate
to compensate the contributions of the foreign investor fully. If,
however, the developing nation is able to supply both a cheap la-
bor force and an extensive new market of consumers, then its at-
tractiveness to foreign investors may increase dramatically. 3
China, therefore, with its vast population and recent surge of con-
sumerism, has one of the greatest opportunities among the devel-
oping nations to attract foreign investment by granting joint ven-
tures access to its home market. The 1979 Joint Venture Law
failed to mention, much less make accessible, the Chinese con-
sumer market. The Chinese market, however, has been opened to
some extent by joint venture contract negotiations that took place
under this cryptic 1979 law.84 For example, in a pre-Implementing
Regulations joint venture between a West German elevator manu-
facturer, Schindler Holding AG/Jardine (Far East) Holding, S.A.
(Schindler) and China Construction Machinery Corporation
(CCMC), the joint venture company was granted the right to sell
joint venture products within the PRC.85 The contract also granted
the joint venture company the exclusive right to sell "services" for
elevators manufactured by the joint venture company, as well as
for any elevators that were "imported under the direct control of
or under a contract with CCMC."8' Most importantly, the contract
allowed the joint venture company to act as a sales agent in the
82 The most essential element that the Chinese can contribute is labor. Klingenberg &
Pattison, supra note 1, at 826.
83 Entry into this virgin market is not without complications.
What percentage of production may be sold inside China is negotiated by the
parties; explicit settlement of this issue can prevent the Chinese government from
unexpectedly routing shipments for export. Defining a domestic allotment per-
centage, however, is perhaps the easiest step when selling within China. The next
stage involves circumnavigating China's poor transporation system, inefficient dis-
tribution process, and unfamiliar pricing mechanism. This last factor is particu-
larly frustrating to investors since the Chinese set selling prices to offer a profit
margin which depends on the quality of the item. If the Chinese determine that a
good is 'inferior,' they may set a price below cost. China is trying to smooth the
various complications . ..but the problem is the basic primitiveness of China's
infrastructure and the incompatibility of its economic system with modern busi-
ness practice.
Id. Incoming Telegram/Japan, supra note 5, at 3. In essence, "the frustrations of trying to
reach the Chinese market are such that . . . unless they are willing to wait for potential
longer term rewards, [investors] are discouraged from joint ventures."
" Trade Report, supra note 1, at 112, § 6.1.
Id. at 112, § 6.3.
66 Id.
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PRC for those Schindler products produced irrespective of the
joint venture company stating that, "[t]he Joint Venture company
shall with the help of CCMC assist clients and organizations to
acquire Schindler products to be installed in their buildings. "87
Through these negotiations Schindler gained access to the Chinese
market for both its joint venture products and its products pro-
duced outside of China. This agreement manifests China's willing-
ness in certain situations to open its market to foreign products
produced both domestically and abroad. Unfortunately for China,
many foreign investors are unwilling to negotiate such an agree-
ment; they want the joint venture law to establish market accessi-
bility and assurances even before negotiations begin.8
The 1983 Implementing Regulations clearly attempt to establish
these market rights as a matter of law."" Articles 56 and 61 open
the Chinese market to those joint venture products that China is
seeking actively. Article 61 "opens the door to the prized Chinese
market by permitting domestic sales for products urgently needed
in China."' 0 Article 56 assists in opening the Chinese consumer
market by integrating the sales programs of the joint venture into
the requisite state and local economic plans. These two articles al-
low "urgently needed" joint venture products to be sold in China
and if the joint venture product does not fall into the "urgently
needed" category, it may, at the discretion of the Chinese, still be
sold in China by being included in the national market scheme.91
A third article of the Implementing Regulations, though it does
not specifically open the Chinese market, recognizes the sale of
joint venture products in China and proposes to subsidize the sale
of urgently needed products from joint ventures that are experi-
encing a foreign exchange imbalance. 92 Article 75 states that when
a joint venture that sells its products in the domestic market ex-
periences an imbalance of foreign exchange, that imbalance will be
solved in either of two ways. The imbalance either will be cor-
rected with funds taken from the local government foreign ex-
change reserve, or if this first approach is not possible, then the
"' Id. at 29. Foreign investors will have to make independent assessment of the marketing
possibilities in China. Id.
88 Incoming Telegram/Implementing Regulations, supra note 4, at 2.
"9 See Implementing Regulations, supra note 5, at 56; Incoming Telegram/Implementing
Regulations, supra note 4, at 1; Implementing Regulations, supra note 5, art. 61.
" See id. at 1.
"' Implementing Regulations, supra note 5, art. 75.
2 Id. art. 75; Incoming Telegram/Japan, supra note 5, at 2.
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State Planning Commission and MOFERT will remedy the imbal-
ance by including the particular joint venture foreign exchange
deficit in the state plan. 3 These methods of financial support will
presumably protect the success of the venture."4 The text of Article
75 may be ambiguous,9 5 but since Article 75 clearly permits domes-
tic sales of joint venture products, and the PRC will finance such
sales, the Chinese market is clearly opening to the foreign investor
who chooses to enter a joint venture.
This release of the "prized Chinese market" is not without com-
plications.9 6 Arrangements like that of Schindler, where apparently
products made outside of China and those produced by the joint
venture may be sold in China, can still come into existence through
negotiation, but they are not guaranteed by law. Important ele-
ments of market accessibility, such as protection from competition,
are still nebulous and, therefore, subject to clarifiction through ei-
ther negotiation or supplemental legislation. Also, questions re-
main as to the definition and classification of "urgently needed"
products and the degree of market accessibility upon expiration of
that need.
The Implementing Regulations have created an avenue of access
to the Chinese market, but details of how that avenue will operate
remain unclear. Potential investors who fear a PRC change in pol-
icy regarding market access will require some evidence of Chinese
adherence to the law before depending on market access as a justi-
fication for investment.9 7
" Implementing Regulations, supra note 5, art. 75.
Incoming Telegram/Implementing Regulations, supra note 4, at 2. The Chinese have at
least made provisions for joint venture products to be sold in and out of China by including
a provision for the ration of production to be allocated to domestic sales among the ele-
ments to be included in a joint venture agreement. See Implementing Regulations, supra
note 5, art. 14.
0" Incoming Telegram/Implementing Regulations, supra note 4, at 2. The complications
revolve around ambiguity and enforcement of rights granted by law (such as the right to
hire and fire workers). See supra note 78 for further discussion.
Incoming Telegram/Implementing Regulations, supra note 4, at 2.
17 See supra note 7. In reality, China's failure to adhere to the commercial laws that it
has established will be no greater wrong than the lack of adherence of many Western na-
tions. Being bound by a contract has not prevented nations from implementing an embargo,
ceasing production of needed materials, nationalizing facilities, or refusing to accept goods.
The policy of independence and keeping control in Chinese hands is practiced in China. See
Note, supra note 2, at 1238. China, like the United States, Europe and Japan, tries to take
advantage of the world market while protecting its own interests. Id. As to the ability of the
Chinese to adhere to the terms of contracts:
[P]roject managers for the three United States engineering companies in Shang-
hai were unanimous that their Chinese clients have adhered to the terms of their
[Vol. 15:389
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In addition, the Implementing Regulations address many other
fundamental areas of joint ventures.98 Arbitration, 9 management
control, 10 0 production schedules,101 banking and accounting proce-
contracts. As one said, though, 'The difficulties are not in the contract. With hind-
sight, I don't think there's anything in our contract I'd change. The difficulty is in
the implementation.' The problems these companies have experienced in imple-
menting their contracts in Shanghai generally can be traced to three causes: dif-
ferences in the way the Chinese and U.S. sides view their non-contractual obliga-
tions to one another; the limitations of authority in the Chinese bureaucratic
system; and, at the personal level, basic differences in professional standards and
relative social and economic values.
The problems and frustrations [foreign investors] feel are most exasperating
generally are not directly related to the terms of their companies' contracts with
the Chinese. In other words, the difficulties they have encountered would not have
been avoided if the contracts had been written differently . . . .Few of the
problems had seriously jeopardized continuation of a project, and when any had
threatened to do so, the Chinese acted to alleviate the situation.
Incoming Telegram/After the Contract, supra note 8, at 1.
Generally, as in any business relationship which is trying to develop in a new environ-
ment, most Americans surveyed by the Department of Commerce in Shanghai recounted the
business tie with China as "a process of learning to work and live in an economic and social
environment totally unlike what they are used to. Sharing the lessons of this experience can
accelerate the learning process for others, but there is no way to bypass it entirely." Id.
'8 Some areas of operation of a joint venture cannot be addressed with laws or regula-
tions. See supra note 71. Also, professional and personal frustration due to the maze of
bureaucracy cannot be addressed in regulations, but can certainly have a severe effect on the
joint venture operation.
The Americans working in Shanghai and dealing with Chinese bureaucracy on a
daily basis believe that the implications of this system only emerge with experi-
ence and were not understood by those who negotiated their company's contracts.
Said one, "implementation of our contract has been significantly different from
what the negotiators anticipated. There was very little recognition by our side of
the impact and control of the authorities. We were totally naive about what it
takes to get things done . . .I don't think our people had any inkling of the bu-
reaucracy that exists.
Incoming Telegram/After the Contract, supra note 8, at 4. The Chinese bureacracy can
cause extended delays, and "even though the contract can protect the U.S. company against
financial loss caused by these delays, the resulting inefficiency conflicts with the engineers'
professional standards and, often, their personal values. The result for some has been a high
level of frustration." Id. at 4. These experiences of past investors are conveyed to future
investors, and should they be viewed negatively, are not able to be overcome through the
mere publication of Implementing Regulations.
For a history of the growth of arbitration, see Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 1, at
831. Various articles discuss the problems that existed after the 1979 Joint Venture Law in
the area of arbitration. See id., supra note 1, at 830-32; Note, supra note 3, at 128, 142-45;
Note, Foreign Investment in the People's Republic of China: Compensation Trade, Joint
Ventures, Industrial Property Protection, and Dispute Settlment, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMe.
L. 233, 244-45 (1980).
,00 For a clear understanding of the management problems that existed before the publi-
cation of the Implementing Regulations, see Jaslow, Practical Consideration in Drafting a
Joint Venture Agreement with China, AM. J. Comp. L. 217-30 (1983); Klingenberg & Patti-
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dures,102 property rights,10 3 determination of profit,104 and repatria-
tion10 5 must all be clearly perceived by both joint venture parties
before the joint venture agreement. In all of these fundamental ar-
eas, the Chinese have used the Implementing Regulations to clarify
the previously vague Joint Venture Law, and this clarification pro-
cess has led to a legally defined joint venture structure that is simi-
lar to joint venture laws used throughout the world.
Overall, the first function of the 1983 Implementing Regula-
tion-the clarification of ambiguities surrounding the 1979 Joint
Venture Law-has been accomplished. The manner in which the
Regulations are organized and the detail they provide certainly ex-
pands the proposals which were first presented to the commercial
world in the 1979 Joint Venture Law. °' As for the second function,
the stimulation of foreign investment, the Implementing Regula-
tions appear to have gone as far as the Chinese are currently capa-
ble of going. Whether the Implementing Regulations will actually
stimulate foreign investment in China may no longer depend upon
the Chinese government, but rather on Western investors. Poten-
tial investors have before them many developing nations, all lobby-
ing for investment. Investment in many of them would involve lit-
tle risk.1 0 7 Few, if any, however, can offer investors the vast market
that China can.108 The Chinese government and people lack experi-
ence in international commercial transactions and are, therefore,
often awkward in their early commercial dealings with the West.
Nevertheless, they have proven over the centuries to be both dili-
gent workers and eager learners. 0 9 The Implementing Regulations
son, supra note 1, at 817-19; Note, supra note 3, at 137-42; Note, supra note 2, at 147-50.
10' For a discussion of production schedules, which includes access to raw materials, pric-
ing and plant output, see Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 1, at 809-10, 824, 832; Note,
supra note 3, at 146. For a discussion of schedule problems due to bureaucracy, see Incom-
ing Telegram/After the Contract, supra note 8, at 1-3.
102 See Trade Report, supra note 1, at 30-32; Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 1, at
832-33.
103 See Klingenburg & Pattison, supra note 1, at 816-23.
104 Jaslow, supra note 100, at 230-46.
105 Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 1, at 811-12, 821-22.
106 See supra notes 27-53 and accompanying text.
1 7 See supra notes 74, 75 and accompanying text.
I" See Wall St. J., supra note 18, at 1, col. 1. For a review of the growing consumer
market in China, see supra note 98.
"9 Ganschow Address, supra note 7. Their centuries of successful existence should make
their diligent work habits and ability to overcome difficulty obvious to Western investors.
The adherence to old ways (see supra note 7) is being discarded by the issuance of new,
codified laws. See supra notes 13, 14 and accompanying text. Reliance by the Chinese on
good faith in all relationships, including contractual, should make reliance on their present
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have provided a vast array of legal details, yet many important is-
sues remain open for private negotiations.110 Such negotiations, if
pursued in good faith, are capable of providing a wealth of oppor-
tunity."' A decision to seek fruitful negotiations now rests with
investors. Potential investors have before them a true "joint ven-
ture" opportunity."' Both investors and China are apprehensive
about potential pitfalls, but the current joint venture law offers
both parties a short-term trial opportunity for a business relation-
ship that could be the inception of a great commercial and political
alliance. As the old Chinese proverb says, "How can you catch tiger
cubs without entering the tiger's cave; so brave we must be!"'1 "
Eileen Golden
promises plausible. See note 59 and accompanying text.
11 See Carter Letter, supra note 62.
" For a discussion of the good faith element of negotiations, see supra note 59 and ac-
companying text. Negotiations made in bad faith can lead to a loss of face for the parties
involved. See generally supra notes 49, 52 and accompanying text.
12 For a general business description of a "joint venture," see M. GODON, MATERIALS ON
COMPERATIVE JOINT BUSINESS VENTUREs (1977).
"' Translation and comment by Zhao Wei Hou, Research Scholar, Department of Law
and Institute of International Law, Wuhan University, Peoples Republic of China, while
doing extended research at the University of Georgia School of Law, Athens, Georgia, May
1984.
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